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Executive Summary
The nation’s first policy allowing all workers to earn and use paid sick days was implemented
in San Francisco in 2007. In general, surveys of workers and employers suggest that the law
is functioning well. Most employers support the law and relatively few report adverse effects.
Among employees, 59,000 or 17 percent of San Francisco’s workforce, worked in firms that
offered no paid sick days in the past, but are now covered, and more than half of all San
Francisco employees who now have paid sick days report some benefit due to the law. Evi-
dence suggests that it is rare for employees to misuse paid sick days. More education and
enforcement may be needed to address remaining instances of employer non-compliance.
This report provides results from recent surveys of 727 employers and 1,194 employees
working in San Francisco regarding the effects of the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance (PSLO).
For workers, survey results find: 
  Despite the availability of either five or nine sick days under the PSLO, the typical worker
with access used only three paid sick days during the previous year, and one-quarter of
employees with access used zero paid sick days.
  More than half of San Francisco employees with access reported benefitting from the
PSLO either because their employer became more supportive of usage, the number of sick
days provided increased, or they were better able to care for themselves or family members. 
  Black, Latino, and low-wage workers were those who most often benefitted from the law,
but were also those most likely to report employer non-compliance.
  Parents with paid sick days were more than 20 percent less likely to send a child with a
contagious disease to school than parents who did not have paid sick days.
For employers, survey results show:
  Employer profitability did not suffer. Six out of seven employers did not report any negative
effect on profitability as a result of the PSLO.
  Most employers reported no difficulty providing sick days to their employees under the
ordinance. Approximately one-third of employers reported any difficulties implementing
the PSLO, and only one-sixth needed to introduce an entirely new paid sick days policy
because of the law. However, some employers (also around one-sixth) are in violation of
the law and still did not offer paid sick days at the time of the survey. 
  Employers are supportive. Two-thirds of employers support the PSLO and one-third are
“very supportive.”
Rates of utilization well below the caps of five and nine days suggest that employees view
paid sick days as a form of insurance—a valuable benefit when illness strikes, but saved
until then and only used as needed. For employers, the findings imply that they will never
pay for many paid sick days earned under the PSLO.
The findings that many employees benefitted from the PSLO, and were more often able to
keep ill children at home, as well as high levels of employer support, imply that the PSLO
generated health benefits. Health care costs for employers and the public should have de-
clined both because sick individuals and their children could get low-cost preventive care,
and by reducing the spread of contagious illnesses in workplaces and schools.
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Introduction
As of mid-2010, paid sick days policies had been considered in nearly half the states, several cities, and in
Congress,1 but in only one case had a universal policy been enacted. In November 2006, San Francisco
voters approved an ordinance allowing any and all workers to earn and use paid sick days (PSD) (Exhibit
1).2 The Paid Sick Leave Ordinance (PSLO) allows workers to earn paid sick days after three months on
the job, to earn up to a maximum of five days per year in small firms and nine days per year in larger firms,
and to use those days for their own health needs, as well as those of other family members (including a
“designated person”). 
Exhibit 1: 
Key Provisions of the San Francisco Paid Sick Leave Ordinance
  Workers begin to accrue leave 90 calendar days after the date of hire. 
  Workers earn one hour of paid leave for every 30 hours of paid work, accumulating a maximum of nine
days in firms with 10 or more employees and five days in smaller firms.
  Leave may be used for workers’ own illness, injury, health conditions, and medical appointments, and
to care for family members or a “designated person.”
  Unused leave (up to the maximum of five or nine days) carries over from one year to the next.
  It is unlawful for employers to retaliate against workers for requesting or using leave under the PSLO.
  Employers are required to post information about the PSLO and maintain records on hours worked and
PSD used.
  The San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement has authority to enforce the PSLO and levy
penalties.3
Under the PSLO, the number of paid sick days that can be carried over from year to year is capped at
nine days for large and five days for small employers. The PSLO cap minimizes employer costs while
encouraging workers to use paid sick days when needed.
Both San Francisco city officials and San Francisco employer groups have characterized the PSLO as
having a low impact on employers and being relatively easy to implement, but to date no empirical re-
search has been available to guide policy development elsewhere.4 This report provides evidence from
workers and benefits managers about the effect of San Francisco’s policy. These data can instruct busi-
nesses, employees, and decision leaders in other areas who are considering similar policies. 
The IWPR survey of employees was conducted by telephone by David Binder Research in January and
February 2010. The sample frame was based on zip codes inside and outside San Francisco and included
both land-line and cell phone numbers. Survey respondents were at least 18 years old and had worked an
average of at least 10 hours per week for at least three months for a private-sector San Francisco firm at
some time after February 2007. Interviews were completed with 1,194 workers.
The IWPR survey of employers was conducted by telephone by National Research LLC in July through
December 2009. The sample was stratified by non-profit status and firm size, and was targeted at benefits
managers. Interviews were completed with 727 San Francisco firms, and the overall response rate was
19 percent among eligible phone numbers attempted. 
Appendices A and B describe the surveys and methodology of this report in detail.
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Background 
Research suggests that paid sick days policies could create various benefits and costs for workers, employers,
and the general public. 
Paid Sick Days Promote Health at Low Cost for Employees and Their Families
Paid sick days reduce the prevalence of employees attending work when they or a family member are ill.
Workers recover from health problems faster when they can take time to recuperate.5 As such these poli-
cies are like insurance: Many people do not become ill in a given month or even year, but if they work
long enough, at some point they will need paid sick days, and use them if they are available.
One criticism of paid sick days legislation is that it is unnecessary because workers already stay home
when they or other family members are ill. But in many employment situations, workers face the pressures
of “presenteeism,” or the practice of workers being on the job when they have a contagious illness.6 Re-
search indicates that paid sick days policies reduce presenteeism.7 Some workers report going to work
while sick because they can’t afford to take unpaid time off, which should also occur less frequently
under paid sick days policies because employees do not lose earnings while they are out sick.8
Policies that support employees’ health needs may also reduce stress, increase loyalty, and improve
morale,9 thereby improving the quality of employees’ lives and improving their performance on the job.
Sending children to school or child care when they have a contagious illness is equivalent to presenteeism
for workers: It spreads disease to other children and their families, as well as to teachers.10 Having paid
leave is the primary factor in parents’ decisions about staying home when their children are sick,11 and
research suggests that having paid sick days is more effective than vacation leave in allowing parents to
stay home with sick children.12 These effects may exist because some vacation leave policies are not flex-
ible enough to be used when children become sick.
The paid sick days legislation in San Francisco might involve costs for employees. For example, employers
could legally reduce all employees’ wages,13 or require that all employees work harder to make up for
paid sick days. However, if employers obstruct paid sick days policies by requiring individual employees
to make up for lost time, or requiring medical certification of illness when it is not legally permitted, or
docking employee wages for time out of work that is supposed to be paid, they are out of compliance
with the law.
Paid Sick Days Provide Benefits at Low Cost to Employers
Some employers are concerned about the possible implementation costs and increased paperwork of paid
sick days legislation. For employers paying workers on an hourly basis, existing work hours tracking sys-
tems may need to be expanded to count earned paid sick days. Additionally, payroll costs can increase
directly among employers who provided unpaid sick days in the past and need to switch to a paid sick
days approach, or if the employer needs to hire replacement workers when employees are out sick. Some
people fear that an increase in payroll costs due to paid sick days legislation will lead employers, and
particularly small businesses, to engage in less hiring or to lay-off existing employees.14
Employers also enjoy benefits from paid sick days. Personnel experts note that the costs of presenteeism
include not just lost productivity—sick workers are paid their full salary, but can’t perform at their peak—
but also a greater likelihood of injuries and mistakes.15 Employers can experience “an even greater re-
duction in productivity” if an illness spreads through a workplace because of presenteeism.16 Research
following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in the United States suggested that more than one-quarter of private
sector employees who contracted the disease did so because of others coming to work while infected,17
causing unnecessary suffering, deaths, and productivity losses. Paid sick days may allow workers to ad-
dress their health needs more quickly and miss less work overall. 
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Paid sick days are likely to improve job satisfaction. Higher job satisfaction is in turn associated with
higher business profitability, and employment benefits affect job satisfaction.18
Paid sick days offer an additional benefit to employers in terms of scheduling. Absences that are not
planned in advance are more difficult and costly for employers to deal with than scheduled time off—
and are nearly half again as expensive in terms of lost productivity.19 Workers with the right to use paid
sick days may be more likely to let their managers know in advance about time needed for family health
care or medical appointments, rather than calling in at the last minute.
Finally, workers with paid sick days are less likely than others to switch jobs, and workers with paid leave
are more likely to return to work after serious health problems.20 Turnover is costly to employers, involving
expenses for advertising, interviewing, testing, and training new workers.21
Some employers may respond to paid sick days by trying to contain costs or expand revenues. For ex-
ample, an employer might lay employees off, reduce employee compensation or other benefits (e.g.,
vacation days), require that employees work harder in order to cover for any lost but paid working time,
or raise prices. 
Paid Sick Days Improve Public Health 
Public health may improve due to paid sick days. As mentioned earlier, presenteeism leads employees to
attend work while contagious, needlessly spreading disease and adversely affecting public health. Sending
children to school or child care when they have a contagious illness spreads disease to children, teachers,
and their families.22
Some researchers expect that paid sick days policies will have longer-term positive effects by increasing
preventive care, reducing emergency room visits by allowing people to go to the doctor during working
hours, and improving the management of chronic diseases, such as diabetes. These effects could reduce
health care costs for workers and their families, employers, and the public, but it is difficult to calculate
a dollar value for these effects with available data. 
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Findings:  Workers and the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance
Paid Sick Days Are Important for Workers
The IWPR employee survey asked whether employees needed paid sick days, and found that more than two-thirds of all workers
had wanted to stay home in the previous year either because they were sick or they needed to care for a sick family member
(Figure 1 and Table 1). Some workers were more likely to need paid sick days than others:
  Single mothers and workers with chronic health conditions were the most likely to report needing paid sick days;23
  Women and workers in the prime working years (ages 25 to 54 years old) were somewhat more likely than the average worker
to need paid sick days; and
  Latino workers were less likely than white, black, or “other” workers to report needing paid sick days. 
Clearly, the need for paid sick days is common among employees, even though many do not need paid sick days during a given year.
Figure 1. Characteristics of Workers Reporting the Need for PSD
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Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
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How Was the PSLO Used?
The median worker – the one who took more
paid sick days than one half of all workers but
fewer than the other half – reported using just
three days of paid sick days in the previous year
(Table 2 and Figure 2). This is far fewer days
than the PSLO provides.24 If this pattern holds
in future years, the law’s restriction on days that
can be carried over from year to year implies
that employees will never use and employers
will never pay for many paid sick days
earned under the PSLO. This finding makes
sense if the PSLO is functioning as a form of
insurance: for example, many individuals pay
for but do not use health insurance in a given
year and, among those who use it, it is rare for
an individual to use each and every benefit pro-
vided in a given plan. The finding also fits na-
tional estimates, which find covered workers in
small firms use an average of 2.2 days per year,
and those in large firms use 3.1 days per year.25
Some workers were more or less likely than
others to use paid sick days (Figure 3). Worker
groups that were the least likely to use paid
sick days included:
  Workers age 55 and older;
  Men; 
  Latinos; and
  Single mothers.
Figure 2. Median Number of PSD Used in the Last 12 Months
Table 1. Percentage and Characteristics of Workers 
Reporting the Need for PSD
Needed Didn't Need
PSD PSD Total N
All Workers 68.9% 31.1% 100.0% 1,176
Age
25 to 54 Years 73.4% 26.6% 100.0% 723
55 or Over 51.5% 48.5% 100.0% 347
Sex
Men 64.4% 35.6% 100.0% 630
Women 74.4% 25.6% 100.0% 546
Race and Ethnicity
Black 63.2% 36.8% 100.0% 84
Latino 60.8% 39.2% 100.0% 108
Other 69.8% 30.2% 100.0% 196
White 71.8% 28.2% 100.0% 747
Parents
With Children 72.8% 27.2% 100.0% 302
No Children 67.3% 32.7% 100.0% 874
Mothers
Mother 75.9% 24.1% 100.0% 146
Not a Mother 67.7% 32.3% 100.0% 1,030
Single Mothers
Single Mother 78.0% 22.0% 100.0% 35
Not a Single Mother 68.5% 31.5% 100.0% 1,141
Workers with Chronic Health Conditions
With Chronic Health Condition 78.1% 21.9% 100.0% 277
No Chronic Health Condition 66.5% 33.5% 100.0% 888
Wage Quartiles
Bottom Wage Quartile 63.1% 36.9% 100.0% 188
Second Wage Quartile 68.1% 31.9% 100.0% 294
Third Wage Quartile 75.2% 24.8% 100.0% 363
Top Wage Quartile 69.9% 30.1% 100.0% 331
Union Member
Union 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 217
Non-Union 69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 948
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
Note: For subsample of workers reporting access to paid sick days.
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
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All in all, more than one-quarter of all workers
with access did not use PSD during the last year.
Among the workers who used some paid sick days:
  Workers with chronic health conditions used
one more paid sick day than other workers, for
an average of five days;26 and
  Single mothers used just three days.
These results suggest that in general the PSLO
is effective in providing sick days to those who
need them most. There appears to be an excep-
tion for the single mothers who report a greater
need for but actually use fewer days, perhaps due
to fears of (illegal) employer penalties for miss-
ing too many days or a more urgent need to save
days in case a child becomes sick, or because
they tend to change jobs frequently so will not
have accumulated as many sick days as other
employees.27
The survey also asked workers to list reasons for
using paid sick days during the previous year,
and permitted multiple answers. Workers re-
sponded that the primary reason for using paid
sick days was due to their own health: More than
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Figure 3. Share of Workers Who Did Not Use PSD in the Last 12 Months
Note: For subsample of workers reporting access to paid sick days.
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
Table 2. Median Number of PSD Used and Share of 
Workers Not Using PSD in the Last 12 Months
WORKERS WHO
USED PSD IN THE
ALL WORKERS LAST 12 MONTHS
Median Number Share Not Median Number
of PSD Used Using PSD of PSD USED N
All Workers 3.0 25.4% 4.0 624
Age
25 to 54 Years 3.0 21.6% 4.0 425
55 and Older 2.0 36.4% 4.0 148
Sex
Men 2.0 27.1% 4.0 314
Women 3.0 23.4% 4.0 310
Race and Ethnicity
Black 3.0 21.5% 4.0 49
Latino 3.0 29.4% 4.0 53
Other 2.0 24.5% 3.0 113
White 3.0 23.7% 4.0 394
Parents 3.0 20.6% 4.0 164
Mothers 3.0 19.3% 4.0 82
Single Mothers 2.0 23.9% 3.0 17
Chronically Ill 4.0 24.7% 5.0 146
Union Member 3.0 23.2% 4.0 136
Note: For subsample of workers reporting access to paid sick days.
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data.
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  Men who used paid sick days were more likely than women to use paid sick days for their own health needs or to care for an
adult family member, while women were more likely to use paid sick days to care for a child;
  Parents who used paid sick days were much less likely than other workers to use it for their own health, with more than half
taking time to care for their children. Mothers were particularly likely to use paid sick days to care for their children31 and par-
ticularly unlikely to use it for their own health needs. Parents were also slightly more likely than other workers to take paid sick
days to care for an adult relative. In fact, one in ten parents reported using PSD to care for both a child and an older relative; 
  Workers with chronic health conditions who took paid sick days were more likely than other workers to use paid sick days for
their own health needs and were more likely than other workers to use PSD to visit a doctor; and
Table 3. Reasons for Using Leave, of Workers Using PSD 
in the Last 12 Months
Own Visit their Care for Care for
Health Doctor a Child an Adult Other N
All Workers 82.8% 32.8% 19.9% 16.1% 10.7% 656
Age
25 to 54 Years 83.7% 31.0% 23.7% 13.7% 10.3% 446
55 or Over 82.6% 40.5% 8.1% 19.2% 11.2% 154
Sex
Men 85.3% 34.2% 16.3% 18.7% 11.4% 330
Women 80.0% 31.3% 24.1% 13.0% 9.9% 326
Race and Ethnicity
Black 72.8% 43.9% 33.7% 14.0% 9.1% 52
Latino 76.9% 39.6% 26.5% 23.3% 9.7% 56
Other 72.7% 27.4% 26.1% 14.4% 8.9% 121
White 89.8% 32.4% 13.8% 13.3% 11.5% 412
Parents
With Children 66.7% 31.2% 60.0% 19.1% 9.7% 181
No Children 89.9% 33.6% 2.2% 14.7% 11.1% 475
Mothers
Mother 60.9% 29.9% 67.6% 11.3% 6.0% 93
Not a Mother 87.0% 33.4% 10.8% 17.0% 11.6% 563
Single Mothers
Single Mother 58.5% 32.1% 86.3% 3.6% 2.6% 21
Not a Single Mother 83.7% 32.9% 17.5% 16.5% 11.0% 635
Workers with Chronic Health Conditions
With Chronic Health Conditions 87.7% 37.6% 14.6% 16.7% 12.7% 153
No Chronic Health Conditions 81.7% 31.9% 21.5% 15.4% 10.0% 498
Wage Quartiles
Bottom Wage Quartile 79.7% 29.6% 18.7% 12.9% 7.0% 82
Second Wage Quartile 74.5% 40.4% 24.0% 14.6% 13.9% 171
Third Wage Quartile 89.4% 32.4% 16.2% 16.1% 12.2% 223
Top Wage Quartile 87.4% 28.3% 20.6% 20.3% 9.0% 180
Union Member
Union 77.4% 40.3% 28.5% 9.9% 12.5% 137
Non-Union 83.9% 31.3% 18.1% 16.9% 10.4% 517
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
four out of five workers
who took paid sick days
reported using it for their
own health needs (Table
3).28 In addition:
  One-third used paid sick
days to visit a doctor or
dentist;29
  One out of five workers
used the time to care for
a sick child;
  One out of six used paid
sick days to care for an
adult relative; and
  One out of 10 workers
used the time for another
purpose, such as a mental
health day, a family rea-
son including death, or a
vacation.30
Workers who used paid sick
days varied by their family
circumstances and other de-
mographic characteristics.
Specifically:
  Older workers who took
paid sick days were
somewhat less likely than
prime-working-age indi-
viduals to use paid sick
days for their own health
needs. They were more
likely to care for an adult
relative while taking paid
sick days, and more often
used paid sick days for
doctor visits;
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  Of all racial/ethnic groups, black workers who took paid sick days were the least likely to use it for their own health, but the
most likely to take it to visit a doctor or to care for a child. Latino workers who used paid sick days were the most likely of all
race/ethnic groups to use the leave to care for an adult and were more likely than workers overall to use PSD to see a doctor. 
These findings suggest that many employees make trade-offs when using paid sick days. Workers with caregiving commitments,
whether for children or other adults in need, tend to use paid sick days to care for others, perhaps using less time for their own health
needs. The PSLO is designed to permit this sort of flexibility, so it supports families in ways that traditional sick days systems—per-
mitting absence only for one’s own illness or injury—formally do not.32 Further, much of the caregiving for others and many of the
doctor visits are likely preventive in nature, indicating that access to paid sick days is likely to improve health over time, improve job
performance, and reduce future absences.33
Workers and Their Families Benefited from the PSLO
Most employees had access to paid sick days before the PSLO went into effect.34 The employer survey found that two-thirds of
employers offered paid sick days prior to the PSLO (see below). These employees (and their employers) might have expected
little change in sick days policies under the law. Seen in this light, it is surprising that, among employees who had the same em-
ployer before and after the PSLO went into effect and who report access to paid sick days, more than half of workers (53.9 per-
cent) reported one or more of the following benefits of the PSLO: their employer became more supportive of using PSD, they
gained additional PSD, or they were better able to care for their own or their families’ health needs (Table 4). In addition:
Table 4. Workers’ Reported Benefits from PSD
Better Able to Care
Employer for Own or Families’ At Least
More Supportive More Days Health Needs One Benefit N
 All Workers 28.2% 11.4% 25.1% 53.9% 671
Age
25 to 54 Years 26.7% 10.1% 21.1% 57.5% 391
55 or Over 34.1% 13.6% 34.0% 43.5% 230
Sex
Men 28.4% 11.2% 23.1% 53.8% 349
Women 28.1% 11.8% 27.5% 54.0% 322
Race/Ethnicity
Black 41.0% 12.3% 29.1% 45.4% 51
Latino 31.0% 18.6% 31.2% 40.8% 60
Other 32.7% 9.3% 30.6% 49.8% 113
White 25.8% 10.3% 21.9% 57.7% 425
Parents 28.9% 11.1% 26.3% 53.6% 164
Mothers 29.7% 6.6% 27.3% 53.9% 83
Chronically Ill 26.6% 8.2% 24.8% 52.0% 168
Union Members 27.9% 12.1% 33.8% 47.0% 153
Low-Wage Workers 32.2% 19.5% 29.6% 44.5% 73
Note: Data are for workers employed by the same firm before and after the PSLO was implemented. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data.
  More than one-quarter of workers
noted that their employer became
more supportive of their taking PSD
because of the PSLO; 
  Black, Latino, older, and low-wage
workers were among those reporting
stronger employer support of paid sick
days following implementation of the
PSLO; 
  One out of four workers (25.1 percent)
reported that they were better able to
care for their own and their families’
health needs because the PSLO was
adopted; 
  Workers of color, including 29.1 per-
cent of black workers and 31.2 percent
of Latino workers; older workers (34.0
percent); mothers (27.3 percent); and
union members (33.8 percent) were
more likely to report better manage-
ment of health needs; and 
  One out of 10 workers said that they
had more days of paid sick leave after
the PSLO was implemented than be-
fore. Latino and low-wage workers
were the most likely to report this, and
mothers were the least likely.
This evidence regarding gains from the PSLO suggests the law is generally functioning as intended to level the playing field
across employers and spread the insurance benefits of paid sick days to many employees who needed, but did not have, paid sick
days prior to the PSLO.
The PSLO had a positive effect on parents’ ability to care for their children. Parents who had paid sick days were much less likely
to report sending a sick child to school in the last year because the parent could not stay home with the child. This experience was
very common among parents—two-thirds (66.4 percent) reported their child had gone to school while sick: 
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  Most parents who lacked paid sick days (75.9 percent) had sent a sick child to school; while
  Half of parents who had paid sick days had done so (53.8 percent). The reduction in the behavior is over 20 full percentage points.
It should be noted that those who believe they lack paid sick days are in fact covered by the law. Although knowledge of paid sick
days coverage dramatically reduces the rates of sick children being sent to school, the rates of parents sending a contagious child
to school remain high even among those who know they have access to the PSLO. This may reflect a pressure that workers feel
not to take many sick days even when they are available, or parents whose children became ill after all available paid sick days
were used up.
One of the major reasons for passing the PSLO was the hope that it would particularly benefit employees who interact with the
public. Anecdotal evidence suggested that, before the PSLO was adopted, many workers in low-wage occupations that involve
public contact—food service, for instance—were not able to stay home when they were sick.35 Presenteeism among these workers
could lead to the spread of disease among the general public. 
Evidence from the employee survey suggests the PSLO had precisely this intended effect (Figure 4). Specifically:
  More than one-third (34.8 percent) of workers who dealt directly with the public—in food service, health care, or retail situations,
for example—reported that their employers were more supportive of workers’ use of paid sick days because of the PSLO.36
  One out of eight workers with public contact (13.2 percent) reported that the PSLO reduced the level of presenteeism—sick
workers on the job—in their workplace.
At the same time, however, workers who had direct contact with the public were more than half again as likely to go to work
when they were sick, even after the PSLO was adopted (24.3 percent), compared to other workers (14.1 percent).37
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Figure 4. Workers Who Benefited Most from the PSLO
Note: Data are for workers employed by the same firm before and after the PSLO was implemented.
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
Few Workers Were 
Negatively Affected 
by the PSLO
Six out of seven workers reported that
their employer did not reduce raises,
bonuses, or other benefits to imple-
ment the PSLO (Table 5). Specifically:
  Four out five workers (78.3 percent)
reported that there were no increased
work demands in their workplace be-
cause of the PSLO; and
  Overall, two-thirds of workers (67.8
percent) reported that their em-
ployer did not increase work de-
mands, reduce work hours, or
reduce compensation in response to
the PSLO. 
Low-wage workers were more likely
than higher-wage workers to report
that their employers took action to re-
duce costs in implementing the
PSLO;38 however, many low-wage
workers also reported having benefit-
ted from the PSLO (see Table 4).
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Employees Report That Most Employers Are Compliant
Most workers reported that their employers were implementing the PSLO (Table 6). Relatively small shares of workers who had
used paid sick days reported the following violations:
  Having to “make up” paid sick days (one out of 10) or find a replacement for their time off (one out of eight);
  Being threatened with loss of wages for using paid sick days (one out of 13) or actually losing wages (one out of 38); and
  Being assigned fewer or less desirable work hours or worse tasks because they used paid sick days (one out of 20).
Table 5. Possible Negative Effects of Increased PSD
Fewer Raises/
Layoffs, Total Bonuses, Other Increased Work Workers Paid in at
Hours Reduced Benefits Reduced Work Demands Least One Way N
All Workers 15.2% 14.1% 21.7% 32.2% 784
Firm Size
Less Than 10 18.1% 17.8% 19.4% 34.9% 202
10 to 24 18.7% 19.6% 24.9% 41.0% 127
25 to 99 8.4% 10.1% 19.4% 23.8% 152
100 or More 13.2% 11.2% 19.1% 28.3% 303
Industry
Information and Professional and Business Services 14.6% 11.5% 17.9% 27.5% 211
Financial Activities 9.3% 5.8% 17.7% 24.8% 96
Educational and Health Services 16.5% 11.3% 25.0% 38.6% 158
Leisure and Hospitality 18.7% 24.3% 25.3% 38.3% 79
Other Services 13.4% 20.6% 26.6% 36.2% 106
Other 18.8% 16.7% 22.0% 32.3% 120
Wage Quartile
Bottom Wage Quartile 28.4% 23.1% 32.0% 51.1% 101
Second Wage Quartile 20.5% 17.9% 24.8% 36.7% 192
Third Wage Quartile 8.8% 11.4% 18.9% 27.6% 254
Top Wage Quartile 5.4% 6.0% 13.3% 16.6% 237
Union Member 14.7% 17.4% 33.1% 37.0% 167
Part-Time 25.4% 16.0% 24.5% 36.3% 177
Temporary or Seasonal Worker 23.2% 20.0% 18.2% 35.3% 91
College Graduate 9.4% 11.5% 14.2% 23.4% 545
Has Paid Vacation Days or PTO 14.3% 14.7% 23.1% 32.1% 615
Has Health Insurance 13.2% 12.4% 21.8% 30.0% 696
Has Paid Sick Days 8.5% 12.5% 16.9% 24.5% 374
No PSD/Not All Uses/Not Enough 27.5% 18.6% 28.1% 43.8% 209
Don't Know 14.9% 12.9% 25.8% 35.3% 189
Note: Data are for workers employed by the same firm before and after the PSLO was implemented.
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data.
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Table 6. Employees Reporting Improper Implementation of the PSLO
Given
Had to Threatened Fewer/Worse Employer Not in
Had to Had Make up With wage Hours or Retaliates Compliance
Make Up to Find Hours or Find Loss or Was Lost Worse for Use of With the
Hours Replacement Replacement Written Up Wages Tasks PSD PSLO N
All Workers 11.3 % 13.9% 20.3% 6.3% 2.6% 4.5% 9.7% 23.7% 477
Age
Age 25 to 54 Years 12.8% 14.2% 21.3% 6.2% 2.4% 4.8% 10.1% 25.2% 331
Age 55 or Over 7.0% 9.3% 14.8% 8.1% 2.9% 4.3% 9.2% 16.6% 133
Sex
Men 7.7% 10.6% 15.7% 3.9% 1.8% 3.6% 7.6% 18.6% 234
Women 15.4% 17.5% 25.5% 8.9% 3.4% 5.5% 12.1% 29.3% 243
Race/Ethnicity
Black 19.2% 32.0% 34.9% 21.5% 13.7% 10.4% 26.0% 40.6% 37
Latino 32.8% 16.9% 38.6% 10.4% 5.0% 3.9% 16.7% 44.9% 30
Other 12.7% 15.0% 23.5% 11.6% 1.3% 7.4% 14.9% 27.3% 85
White 6.2% 11.2% 14.7% 1.6% 1.7% 2.6% 4.4% 17.3% 315
Parents 14.9% 10.8% 23.3% 5.7% 3.1% 6.1% 9.5% 27.1% 131
Mothers 16.4% 13.9% 28.1% 8.8% 4.3% 4.3% 9.3% 30.1% 66
Chronically Ill 8.7% 15.0% 20.0% 4.0% 3.9% 5.0% 10.0% 26.2% 115
Union Members 7.1% 19.4% 24.5% 12.1% 0.0% 7.0% 17.0% 29.4% 99
Firm Size
Less Than 10 8.2% 18.2% 23.8% 4.4% 3.6% 7.8% 8.6% 27.5% 86
10 to 24 22.0% 22.2% 33.6% 8.1% 0.5% 5.8% 13.4% 38.9% 77
25 to 99 12.4% 11.9% 17.5% 6.8% 2.1% 3.6% 8.0% 18.0% 109
100 or More 7.6% 9.5% 14.6% 6.0% 3.3% 2.8% 9.6% 18.5% 205
Industry
Information and Professional
and Business Services 14.4% 13.8% 20.7% 6.5% 2.5% 4.2% 9.6% 22.8% 169
Financial Activities 6.9% 6.0% 10.2% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 11.7% 53
Educational and Health Services 12.3% 12.3% 22.2% 7.4% 3.7% 8.6% 18.8% 34.1% 101
Leisure and Hospitality 1.2% 22.6% 23.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 3.5% 27.4% 37
Other Services 13.1% 16.3% 22.0% 9.7% 4.1% 1.6% 9.7% 23.4% 64
Other 14.7% 17.6% 26.0% 14.4% 3.8% 8.7% 14.2% 26.0% 48
Wage Quartiles
Bottom Wage Quartile 20.0% 35.7% 39.9% 20.0% 2.6% 7.0% 26.9% 44.2% 45
Second Wage Quartile 8.8% 16.8% 21.7% 7.3% 4.3% 7.2% 10.1% 25.4% 118
Third Wage Quartile 8.5% 10.7% 15.7% 3.3% 2.1% 3.5% 6.0% 19.5% 172
Top Wage Quartile 11.4% 3.3% 13.3% 0.9% 1.7% 2.0% 3.7% 15.3% 142
Note: Data are for workers who used PSD in the last 12 months. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data.
15
San Francisco’s Paid Sick Leave Ordinance
Women, black, and Latino workers; parents;
and low-wage workers were more likely to
report having to “make up” their PSD or
find a worker to fill in for their leave. Work-
ers in the leisure and hospitality industry
and “other” industries were the most likely
to report one of these situations. 
The PSLO allows employers to require con-
firmation from a health care practitioner
when workers use paid sick days for more
than three consecutive days, but workers’ re-
ports suggest that some employers request
documentation for shorter leaves. For in-
stance, two-fifths of low-wage workers who
took paid sick days reported that they had
been asked to show that they needed the
time off—but only one-fourth had taken a
total of more than three days (Table 7). 
Although half of workers benefited from the
PSLO, and most employers implemented
paid sick days, implementation was not al-
ways perfect. Most workers reported that
they could use paid sick days when they
were ill themselves, and two-thirds reported
that they could use paid sick days to care for
family member or to see a doctor (see Ap-
pendix Table 1). Similarly, around two-
thirds of workers accrued paid sick days at
the required rate of one hour for every 30
hours of work. However, 29.0 percent of
workers reported either not having all uses
available or not accruing sick days at the re-
quired rate, and an additional 26.9 percent
were not certain whether they were covered
by paid sick days as required by the PSLO.
In particular:
  Men were less likely than women, and
older workers less likely than younger
workers, to report that they could use PSD
to care for a family member; 
  Latino and black workers were less likely
to report having full PSLO benefits; 
  Parents, and particularly single mothers,
were less likely than other workers to re-
port that they could use PSD for their own
health needs, and relatively few single
mothers (29.9 percent) report having all
the required elements of the PSLO.
Table 7. Characteristics of Workers Who Were Asked 
for Documentation for Using PSD
Yes No N
All Workers 23.9% 76.1% 709
Firm Size
Less Than 10 21.3% 78.7% 145
10 to 24 31.8% 68.2% 114
25 to 99 24.3% 75.7% 159
100 or More 21.5% 78.5% 291
Industry
Information and Professional 
and Business Services 17.4% 82.6% 234
Financial Activities 15.5% 84.5% 77
Educational and Health Services 23.8% 76.2% 145
Leisure and Hospitality 30.9% 69.1% 58
Other Services 29.0% 71.0% 103
Other 34.5% 65.5% 82
Wage Quartiles
Bottom Wage Quartile 38.6% 61.4% 91
Second Wage Quartile 29.4% 70.6% 189
Third Wage Quartile 17.7% 82.3% 242
Top Wage Quartile 10.3% 89.7% 187
Union Member
Union 41.0% 59.0% 140
Non-Union 20.3% 79.7% 565
Part-Time
Part-Time 39.8% 60.2% 114
Full-Time 22.1% 77.9% 595
Temporary or Seasonal Worker
Temporary/Seasonal 37.2% 62.8% 66
Not Temporary/Seasonal 22.7% 77.3% 629
College Graduate
College Graduate 11.7% 88.3% 523
Not College Graduate 39.5% 60.5% 181
Has Paid Vacation or PTO
Has Paid Vacation/PTO 23.2% 76.8% 629
No Paid Vacation/PTO 28.8% 71.2% 70
Has Health Insurance
Has Health Insurance 22.0% 78.0% 655
No Health Insurance 44.0% 56.0% 51
Note: Data are for workers who used PSD in the last 12 months. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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Employers and the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance
Few Employers Had to Change Policies for the PSLO
Patterns of employer sick leave provision and compliance reflected in the employer survey are consistent with reports from em-
ployees. As was found in the employee survey results, it should be the case that most employers already offered paid sick days
policies. Other employers should have responded to the ordinance with a new or expanded paid sick days policy. The employee
survey results also suggest that non-compliance will be concentrated among small businesses. The employer survey results fit
these expectations.
Two-thirds of San Francisco’s employers offered paid sick days before the PSLO went into effect, according to employer reports
(Table 8). In response to the PSLO:
  Approximately one out of six firms enacted a new paid sick days policy. A similar share increased their existing PSD accrual
rate, and one-sixth of employers expanded the share of their workforce covered by paid sick days (Appendix Table 2); and
  Overall, one-third of employers made at least one of these three changes, and most employers (two out of three) were unaf-
fected by the PSLO.
According to the employer survey, the PSLO
expanded paid sick days coverage to more
than 59,000 San Francisco workers, or 17 per-
cent of all San Francisco employees; although
it is important to recall (see Table 4, above)
that half of all employees reported some ben-
efit from the ordinance.39
San Francisco’s smallest firms were the least
responsive to the PSLO. Among employers
with fewer than 10 workers, one-quarter im-
plemented or expanded a paid sick days pol-
icy in response, but one-third did not have a
paid sick days policy at the time of the sur-
vey. On the other hand, nearly all firms with
10 or more workers offered paid sick days at
the time of the survey, and more than half had
enacted one or more changes in response to
the PSLO.
Firms that enacted a new paid sick days pol-
icy in response to the PSLO tended to be:
  In the construction and accommodation and
food service industries;
  Low-wage firms; and
  Firms with low work hours.
Employers Had Little Difficulty
Implementing the PSLO 
As discussed earlier, employers may report
costs around implementing the PSLO or in-
creased benefits costs, particularly if they
need to hire replacements for employees
using paid sick days. The employer survey
asked about implementation issues and hiring
replacements, with benefits costs implicitly
accounted for in a question regarding prof-
itability (see following page).
Table 8. Firms Providing PSD Before and After the PSLO
Provided PSD Provides
Firm Characteristics Before the PSLO PSD Now
All Firms 65.1% 82.1%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 63.3% 78.4%
10 to 24 66.1% 92.0%
25 to 49 74.3% 97.5%
50 or More 83.6% 99.4%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 23.6% 62.1%
Construction 29.8% 69.3%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 67.7% 89.2%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 87.0% 93.2%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 79.9% 85.3%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 61.5% 77.9%
Other Services 54.5% 78.5%
Other 79.6% 91.6%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 51.1% 69.7%
High-Wage Firms 71.4% 87.1%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 52.6% 73.7%
High-Hours Firms 78.6% 88.7%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 67.7% 82.3%
Other Firms 56.8% 80.8%
Diverse Workforce
50% or More of Employees Are Non-White 72.9% 84.5%
Other Firms 48.7% 76.1%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Uni on Members 80.4% 91.8%
No Union Members 64.4% 81.7%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-
wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30 percent of employees in “low-hours firms”
work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employee and employer survey data. 
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San Francisco employers reported little to moderate difficulty in implementing the PSLO (Table 9). Specifically:
  Half reported that it was “not difficult” or “not too difficult” to understand the requirements of the PSLO, and another one out
of seven did not know;
  Half reported that it was “not difficult” or “not too difficult” to administer the PSLO, and another one out of seven did not
know; and
  Half reported that it was “not difficult” or “not too difficult” to reassign or delay work while workers used paid sick days, and
another one out of 10 did not know.
Table 9. Firms’ Reports of Difficulty Implementing the PSLO
S H A R E  O F  F I R M S  R E P O R T I N G :
Understanding the Requirements
of the PSLO Administering the PSLO Reassigning or Delaying Work
“Not too “Somewhat “Not too “Somewhat “Not too “Somewhat
Difficult” Difficult” Difficult” Difficult” Difficult” Difficult”
or “Not or “Very or “Not or “Very or “Not or “Very
Firm Characteristics Difficult” Difficult” “Don’t Know” Difficult” Difficult” Don’t Know” Difficult” Difficult” Don’t Know”
All Firms 52.0% 34.6% 13.4% 53.9% 31.4% 14.7% 48.2% 42.7% 9.0%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 49.3% 34.1% 16.6% 53.7% 28.3% 18.0% 45.0% 44.2% 10.8%
10 to 24 57.4% 39.9% 2.7% 53.8% 41.0% 5.2% 57.5% 39.6% 2.8%
25 to 49 66.6% 29.4% 3.9% 53.7% 42.5% 3.9% 61.6% 34.8% 3.6%
50 or More 65.4% 30.9% 3.6% 56.5% 39.8% 3.7% 59.2% 36.5% 4.4%
Industry
Accommodation and 
Food Service 44.4% 50.0% 5.5% 36.6% 57.9% 5.5% 40.7% 59.0% 0.3%
Construction 53.0% 46.1% 0.9% 41.0% 53.2% 5.8% 53.7% 40.5% 5.8%
Education, Health Care, and 
Social Services 60.6% 23.2% 16.2% 69.9% 12.6% 17.5% 51.1% 39.7% 9.3%
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 51.5% 27.9% 20.6% 68.1% 17.1% 14.8% 58.7% 33.7% 7.7%
Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services 63.7% 30.8% 5.5% 55.3% 33.8% 10.9% 49.8% 40.1% 10.0%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 44.8% 39.8% 15.4% 55.8% 26.3% 17.9% 54.6% 29.9% 15.5%
Other Services 55.2% 34.2% 10.6% 56.2% 31.4% 12.4% 34.0% 55.8% 10.2%
Other 41.8% 32.2% 26.0% 40.5% 33.1% 26.4% 41.0% 50.8% 8.2%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 55.5% 37.5% 7.0% 57.0% 30.7% 12.3% 52.7% 38.7% 8.6%
High-Wage Firms 57.6% 22.0% 20.4% 58.1% 20.7% 21.2% 50.9% 36.3% 12.8%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 56.5% 30.3% 13.1% 56.7% 28.4% 14.9% 49.1% 42.7% 8.2%
High-Hours Firms 47.9% 34.3% 17.8% 47.7% 32.7% 19.6% 46.8% 41.9% 11.3%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of 
Employees Are Women 52.1% 36.6% 11.3% 54.6% 34.0% 11.4% 45.8% 45.0% 9.3%
Other Firms 53.0% 27.3% 19.6% 53.5% 22.3% 24.2% 56.6% 35.0% 8.4%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of 
Employees Are Non-White 54.8% 28.8% 16.4% 58.9% 22.6% 18.5% 46.0% 42.5% 11.6%
Other Firms 47.7% 43.5% 8.9% 45.9% 44.8% 9.3% 51.7% 43.6% 4.6%
Union Workforce
Some Employees Are 
Union Members 47.2% 49.5% 3.3% 47.8% 48.9% 3.3% 46.2% 51.0% 2.8%
No Union Members 52.2% 33.8% 13.9% 54.2% 30.5% 15.3% 48.3% 42.3% 9.3%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30
percent of employees in “low-hour firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data
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It is possible that one response to these difficulties lay in non-compliance, and one-quarter of employers who reported difficulties
implementing the PSLO also reported providing no paid sick days in the survey.
Smaller firms reported finding it easier to administer the PSLO, but more difficult to adjust workload for absent workers. They
were also much more likely to answer that they did not know whether it was difficult to understand or implement the PSLO or to
manage workload when workers used paid sick days. The restaurant and hospitality industry showed higher rates of difficulty
implementing the PSLO, perhaps because few employers had paid sick days before the ordinance, or because they often needed
to hire replacement workers.
Employers were also asked about hiring replace-
ment workers to cover for workers using paid sick
days. Few did so; nine out of 10 firms answered
that they never or rarely hired replacements when
workers used paid sick days (Figure 5 and Appen-
dix Table 3). The hospitality industry was the only
industry that significantly used replacements,
with just under one-third of firms reporting that
they brought in outside workers “always” or “fre-
quently” to replace workers using paid sick days.
However, hospitality firms that actually provided
paid sick days reported rarely using replacement
workers; the firms that did not offer paid sick
days were more likely to use this staffing
strategy.40 The generally low rates of replacement
hiring are consistent with the finding that employ-
ees reported increased work demands as the most
common employer response to the PSLO (21.7
percent overall, and 25.3 percent in the leisure
and hospitality industry; see Table 5).
Employer Benefits from the 
Paid Sick Leave Ordinance
Employer reports of cost-savings or improved
employee performance should be limited to the
minority of employers who implemented or im-
proved policies in response to the PSLO. It fol-
lows that most employers will report only
minimal changes in these aspects of business per-
formance, and the data reflect this pattern.
Most employers reported that the PSLO had no
effect on the predictability of employee absence,
employee morale, customer service, or employees
coming to work sick (Table 10 and Appendix
Table 4). Approximately one out of seven did not
know if complying with the PSLO had affected
these aspects of their business. 
All Firms
1 to 9 Employees
10 to 24 Employees
25 to 49 Employees
50 or More Employees
Accommodation and Food Service
Construction
Education, Healthcare, and Social Services 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
Retail and Wholesale Trade
Other
Other Services
O% 1O% 2O% 3O% 4O% 5O% 6O% 7O% 8O% 9O% 10O%
Percent of Firms Answering “Frequently” or “Always” 
O% 1O% 2O% 3O% 4O% 5O% 6O% 7O% 8O% 9O% 10O%
Figure 5. Firms Reporting Hiring Replacements for 
Workers Using PSD
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data.
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Net Effects and Employer Support for the PSLO
As shown below (Table 11), most employers—more than two out of three—reported no impact on profitability, whereas an ad-
ditional one-seventh reported they did not know if there were any effects. The group that reported positive profitability effects is
very small (0.6 percent), and a larger group reported negative effects (14.2 percent). Overall, six out of every seven San Francisco
employers did not report negative profitability effects from the PSLO.
The industries where reports of adverse profitability effects occurred most frequently were in accommodation and food service,
construction, retail and wholesale trade, and other services. Not surprisingly, these are the same industries where new paid sick
days were implemented most frequently in response to the PSLO (see Table 8). 
Although respondents in this minority of industries reported perceived profitability declines, higher coverage in these industries
is especially likely to result in public health gains. Excepting construction, new paid sick days coverage in these industries should
have generated substantial public health benefits due to employees working closely with customers. A check revealed that prof-
itability declines were not associated with reports of policy change in response to the PSLO (three-quarters of respondents re-
porting policy change also reported no impact on profits).
Table 10. Effect of PSLO on the Predictability of Absence
I m p a c t  o n  P r e d i c t a b i l i t y  o f  Em p l o y e e  A b s e n c e s
Better About the Same Worse Don't Know
All Firms 3.8% 75.5% 6.9% 13.9%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 3.8% 75.7% 3.5% 16.9%
10 to 24 3.3% 74.8% 17.1% 4.8%
25 to 49 5.3% 76.0% 15.0% 3.7%
50 or More 3.3% 72.8% 18.7% 5.2%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 1.6% 65.8% 11.8% 20.7%
Construction 20.2% 54.8% 15.9% 9.2%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 3.5% 67.5% 11.8% 17.2%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 5.4% 84.4% 2.8% 7.4%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 6.4% 81.0% 1.8% 10.8%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.4% 78.1% 6.1% 15.4%
Other Services 1.9% 67.4% 3.5% 27.3%
Other 1.6% 83.8% 12.0% 2.6%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 1.8% 76.7% 7.0% 14.5%
High-Wage Firms 5.3% 76.3% 4.7% 13.8%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 5.4% 70.5% 10.9% 13.3%
High-Hours Firms 4.4% 79.3% 5.5% 10.8%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 4.8% 73.8% 7.3% 14.1%
Other Firms 0.2% 80.8% 6.0% 13.0%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of Employees Are Non-White 5.0% 77.4% 2.7% 14.9%
Other Firms 1.8% 72.1% 13.0% 13.1%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Union Members 6.2% 74.2% 14.6% 5.1%
No Union Members 3.6% 75.5% 6.5% 14.3%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30
percent of employees in “low-hour firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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Some firms may have reported no adverse profitability effects because they found ways to contain costs or improve revenues
while implementing the PSLO. However, more than eight in 10 employers report that they did not make any of the changes asked
about in the survey. Further, only 14.1 percent of employees reported that their employer reduced compensation or benefits (see
Table 5), while a very similar proportion of employers (12.8 percent) reported reductions in employee compensation (Table 12).
Specifically, 2.8 percent reduced vacation leave; 7.1 percent converted vacation leave to paid time off or paid sick days; and 7.1
percent reduced raises or bonuses.
A smaller proportion of employers (10.9 percent) said they increased prices in response to the PSLO (results not shown). These
employers were concentrated in the same industries where the PSLO led to the most dramatic expansion in coverage, and where
employers reported adverse profitability effects—accommodation and food services, construction, retail and wholesale trade,
and other services. In at least some cases, these employers were able to pass along these costs to customers.
Table 11. Effect of PSLO on Profitability
I m p a c t  o n  P r o f i t a b i l i t y
Better About the Same Worse Don't Know
All Firms 0.6% 70.6% 14.2% 14.6%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 0.6% 70.3% 12.0% 17.0%
10 to 24 0.2% 71.0% 22.7% 6.2%
25 to 49 2.0% 73.8% 19.9% 4.3%
50 or More 0.4% 70.4% 18.4% 10.9%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 0.0% 64.9% 17.4% 17.7%
Construction 5.7% 62.2% 25.6% 6.6%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 2.1% 70.4% 6.9% 20.6%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 1.1% 78.6% 7.9% 12.4%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.1% 78.2% 10.1% 11.6%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0% 71.3% 16.0% 12.7%
Other Services 0.0% 45.9% 24.0% 30.1%
Other 0.4% 76.2% 17.4% 6.1%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 1.1% 63.2% 15.9% 19.8%
High-Wage Firms 0.6% 76.3% 10.4% 12.7%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 1.2% 68.8% 17.3% 12.8%
High-Hours Firms 0.7% 70.9% 16.7% 11.8%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 0.8% 68.0% 16.1% 15.1%
Other Firms 0.2% 77.6% 9.2% 12.9%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of Employees Are Non-White 0.3% 71.0% 14.4% 14.3%
Other Firms 1.3% 69.5% 14.9% 14.3%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Union Members 1.1% 56.0% 32.5% 10.4%
No Union Members 0.6% 71.3% 13.3% 14.8%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30
percent of employees in “low-hour firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week.
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data.  
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Two out of three firms were “supportive” or “very supportive” of the PSLO, of which one-third reported being “very supportive”
(Figure 6 and Table 13). The same four industries where reported profitability issues emerged were also those with the lowest
levels of support for the PSLO—accommodation and food services, construction, retail and wholesale trade, and other services.
However, even in these industries, more than 60 percent of employers in accommodation and food services and in retail
and wholesale trade are supportive, whereas fewer than 30 percent of employers in the construction industry report not
being supportive.41 Most employers supported the PSLO.
Table 12. Employer Changes to Compensation in Response to the PSLO
Converted Reduced
Decreased Vacation to Raises or One or More of These Responses
Firm Characteristics Vacation Time PTO or PSD Bonuses Yes Don't Know No
All Firms 2.8% 7.1% 7.1% 12.8% 6.6% 80.6%
 Number of Employees
1 to 9 1.4% 5.0% 6.2% 10.1% 7.6% 82.3%
10 to 24 8.8% 15.5% 11.7% 22.7% 4.2% 73.1%
25 to 49 5.9% 11.8% 9.8% 21.5% 2.7% 75.9%
50 or More 5.4% 11.6% 5.5% 17.7% 1.8% 80.6%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 5.1% 6.9% 10.0% 16.4% 20.7% 62.8%
Construction 15.6% 19.8% 15.6% 34.5% 0.0% 65.5%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 0.4% 12.1% 20.6% 30.1% 2.3% 67.6%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.9% 5.1% 0.1% 6.0% 1.0% 92.9%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 1.5% 8.0% 4.3% 9.4% 1.8% 88.8%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 1.0% 2.8% 1.2% 4.1% 5.9% 89.9%
Other Services 2.4% 3.7% 11.1% 13.2% 18.7% 68.1%
Other 6.3% 9.0% 7.8% 13.1% 3.4% 83.4%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 4.7% 4.3% 6.6% 11.4% 10.0% 78.7%
High-Wage Firms 1.8% 8.0% 6.7% 13.1% 2.5% 84.4%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 2.2% 10.5% 8.1% 18.9% 12.7% 68.4%
High-Hours Firms 3.2% 6.6% 9.2% 13.0% 3.4% 83.6%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 3.7% 7.8% 6.9% 12.6% 7.9% 79.5%
Other Firms 0.5% 5.3% 8.1% 13.7% 2.8% 83.5%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of Employees Are Non-White 1.5% 5.9% 6.4% 10.6% 2.9% 86.6%
Other Firms 5.4% 9.3% 9.2% 17.4% 12.0% 70.6%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Union Members 3.8% 6.9% 8.2% 12.1% 3.2% 84.7%
No Union Members 2.8% 7.1% 7.1% 12.8% 6.8% 80.4%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30
percent of employees in “low-hours” firms work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data.
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1 to 9 Employees
10 to 24 Employees
25 to 49 Employees
50 or More Employees
Accommodation and Food Service
Construction
Education, Healthcare, and Social Services 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
Retail and Wholesale Trade
Other
Other Services
Percent of Firms Answering “Very Supportive” or “Supportive” 
O% 1O% 2O% 3O% 4O% 5O% 6O% 7O% 8O% 9O%
O% 1O% 2O% 3O% 4O% 5O% 6O% 7O% 8O% 9O%
All Firms
Figure 6. Firms Supporting the PSLO
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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Table 13. Percentage of Firms Supporting the PSLO
Sha re  o f  F i rms  S ta t i ng  Spec i f i ed  Leve l  o f  Suppo r t
Firm Characteristics Very Somewhat Not Supportive Don't Know
All Firms 33.9% 34.5% 23.6% 8.0%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 34.9% 33.7% 22.0% 9.4%
10 to 24 27.3% 39.5% 31.5% 1.7%
25 to 49 38.7% 32.5% 24.3% 4.4%
50 or More 33.3% 35.0% 23.0% 8.7%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 12.0% 53.7% 31.6% 2.7%
Construction 7.7% 40.3% 28.1% 23.8%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 52.2% 32.9% 12.3% 2.6%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 59.9% 23.4% 12.2% 4.6%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 30.3% 43.2% 16.0% 10.5%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 34.4% 27.4% 30.9% 7.2%
Other Services 29.3% 21.7% 35.6% 13.4%
Other 28.5% 32.5% 29.4% 9.6%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 30.8% 40.7% 20.3% 8.2%
High-Wage Firms 37.6% 31.4% 19.8% 11.2%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 27.2% 39.5% 26.3% 7.0%
High-Hours Firms 34.4% 32.2% 24.1% 9.3%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 32.0% 34.0% 24.5% 9.5%
Other Firms 39.0% 37.4% 21.1% 2.4%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of Employees Are Non-White 39.2% 32.0% 21.9% 7.0%
Other Firms 28.0% 37.1% 27.2% 7.8%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Union Members 23.1% 19.9% 49.3% 7.8%
No Union Members 34.5% 35.3% 22.3% 8.0%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30 percent
of employees in “low-hours firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
Among the minority of employers who were not supportive of the PSLO, most (two-thirds) reported hiring replacement workers
always or frequently. 
The generally high levels of support may reflect the fact that paid sick days are simply becoming a way of doing business in the
city, rather than the burden some expected to see.
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Conclusion: 
How Well Is the Paid Sick Leave Ordinance Working?
San Francisco’s Paid Sick Leave Ordinance expanded paid sick leave to thousands of employees, accord-
ing to both employee and employer reports, although only one in six employers implemented a new paid
sick days policy to comply with the ordinance.42 Most San Francisco employers reported that implement-
ing the PSLO was not difficult and that it did not negatively affect their profitability. Half of San Francisco
workers benefited directly from the PSLO in terms of their ability to use paid sick days—even though
more than one-third of workers said they did not use any paid sick days in the previous year. Thus, the
evidence presented in this report suggests that the PSLO is functioning as intended to level the playing
field across employers and spread the benefits of paid sick days to employees who previously needed
but did not have paid sick days.
The PSLO created costs for a relatively small share of employers and employees. Only one in seven em-
ployers reported adverse effects on profitability, and a similar proportion of employees reported fewer
raises or bonuses or reductions in other benefits. In part, it appears that many employers offset potential
costs by having co-workers fill in when others were absent, rather than hiring replacement workers. Of
course, these employers may ultimately benefit due to reductions in employee turnover, and by having a
healthier and more productive workforce.
The finding that so few employers were adversely affected contradicts speculation from employer groups
that paid sick days policies would increase costs among employers who already had paid sick days systems
in place.43 The reason this speculation turned out to be unfounded is simple: employees in San Francisco
use fewer than half of the sick days available under the PSLO, and employers will never pay for many of
these unused days. This finding is not surprising, given the way that workers earn paid time off under the
PSLO. Employees can earn a maximum of up to five or nine paid sick days, and carry up to that many
days over from one year to the next. This structure gives employees an incentive to treat paid sick days
as a form of insurance, saving paid sick days in case they need the time for their own illness or that of a
family member. Many workers will end up not having to use any paid sick days in a given year.
Workers’ reports of their reasons for using paid sick days suggest that many employees make strategic
trade-offs in taking this leave. For instance, workers with caregiving commitments, whether for children
or other adults in need, tend to use paid sick days to care for others, not themselves. This underscores the
importance of the PSLO’s design, as compared to sick leave policies that can be used only for a worker’s
own illness or injury.
Employer and worker reports suggest that some challenges remain in order to fully implement the PSLO;
however, extending public and employer education about the law and employer compliance are para-
mount. Although most employers appear to be in compliance with the requirements of the PSLO and are
supportive of the law, a significant minority of workers report that they still lack paid sick days (see Ap-
pendix Table 1). And nearly one in five employers report that they do not offer paid sick days. Finally, it
appears that many employers and workers are not familiar with the requirements of the PSLO, despite
the outreach conducted by several public agencies to familiarize employers and workers with the law.44
If there is a bottom line to San Francisco employer responses to the PSLO, it does not necessarily lie in
perceptions of costs, benefits, or profitability, but in whether they support the law. Although most busi-
nesses already provide paid sick days in the United States, employer organizations have often opposed
mandates such as the PSLO.45 However, two-thirds of employers in the only city with experience with a
paid sick days mandate for all workers are supportive of the policy. 
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Appendix A: Methodology for the Survey of Workers
The survey of workers was conducted by telephone by David Binder Research in January and February 2010. The sample frame
was constructed by David Binder Research based on zip codes inside and outside San Francisco and included both land-line and
cell phone numbers. The survey was designed by the Institute for Women’s Policy Research. Survey respondents were at least 18
years old and had worked an average of at least 10 hours per week for at least three months for a private-sector San Francisco
firm at some time after February 2007. Interviews were completed with 1,194 workers.
The Institute for Women’s Policy Research imputed missing wage data and created post-stratification weights using Stata’s raking
procedure to represent the demographic (gender, age, ethnicity, and education) and employment (industry, wage, and work hours)
characteristics of private-sector San Francisco workers in 2008 according to the American Community Survey.
Total 1,194 100.0%
Age
18 to 24 Years 41 6.4%
25 to 54 Years 733 68.4%
55 or Over 420 25.2%
Gender
Men 639 55.2%
Women 555 44.8%
Race and Ethnicity
Black 86 5.7%
Latino 108 15.9%
Other 197 25.4%
White 761 53.0%
Parents
Has Children 307 28.5%
No Children 887 71.5%
Mothers
Mother 150 14.0%
Not A Mother 1,044 86.0%
Single Mothers
Single Mothers 35 3.6%
Others 1,159 96.4%
Workers with Chronic Health Conditions
Has Chronic Health Condition 281 20.2%
No Chronic Health Condition 902 79.8%
Union Member
Union Member 220 17.1%
Non-Union 963 82.9%
Firm Size
Less Than 10 320 28.1%
10 to 24 197 17.6%
25 to 99 248 21.1%
100 or More 429 33.3%
Industry
Information and Prof. and Business Services 353 28.1%
Financial Activities 128 14.6%
Educational and Health Services 240 14.9%
Leisure and Hospitality 117 12.3%
Other Services 164 11.2%
Other 173 19.0%
Wage Quartiles
Bottom Wage Quartile 189 26.6%
Second Wage Quartile 296 24.8%
Third Wage Quartile 372 23.6%
Top Wage Quartile 337 25.0%
Union Member
Union 220 17.1%
Non-Union 963 82.9%
Part-Time
Part-Time 281 16.1%
Not Part-Time 913 83.9%
Temporary or Seasonal Worker
Temporary or Seasonal Worker 154 14.2%
Not Temporary or Seasonal Worker 1,017 85.8%
College Graduate
College Graduate 856 57.4%
Not a College Graduate 328 42.6%
Has Paid Vacation or PTO
Has Paid Vacation or PTO 890 76.2%
No Paid Vacation or PTO 275 23.8%
Has Health Insurance
Has Health Insurance 1,034 84.2%
No Health Insurance 154 15.8%
Appendix Table A: Sample Sizes and Weighted Distribution, Worker Survey
Source: IWPR analysis of employee survey data. 
Sample Weighted
Size Distribution
Sample Weighted
Size Distribution
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Appendix B: 
Methodology for 
the Survey of Employers
The 2009 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits
Survey (BAEHBS) was conducted by telephone
by National Research LLC in July through De-
cember 2009.46 The survey was designed by
William H. Dow, Arindrajit Dube, and Carrie
Hoverman Colla of the University of California
Berkeley as part of an evaluation of San Fran-
cisco’s Health Care Security Ordinance
(HCSO); staff of the Institute for Women’s Pol-
icy Research collaborated on writing the ques-
tions about the PSLO. The sample frame was
based on the 2007 Dun and Bradstreet database
of businesses. The sample was stratified by non-
profit status and firm size, and the survey was
targeted at benefits managers. Interviews were
completed with 727 San Francisco firms.47 The
overall response rate was 19 percent among el-
igible phone numbers attempted. 
The Institute for Women’s Policy Research cre-
ated post-stratification weights using Stata’s
raking procedure to represent the firm-size and
industry distribution of San Francisco establish-
ments in 2008 according to the U.S. Census Bu-
reau’s County Business Patterns data.
Appendix Table B: Sample Sizes and Weighted 
Distribution, Employer Survey 
Sample Weighted
Size Distribution
Offers Paid Sick Days
Paid Sick Days 682 84.2%
No Paid Sick Days 36 15.8%
Total 718 100.0%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 190 77.2%
10 to 24 206 13.9%
25 to 49 145 4.6%
50 or more 186 4.3%
Total 727 100.0%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 80 12.0%
Construction 37 4.4%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 86 11.3%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 91 12.9%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 197 19.9%
Retail 46 12.4%
Other 190 27.1%
Total 727 100.0%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 167 19.6%
Other Firms 192 24.0%
High-Wage Firms 368 56.5%
Total 727 100.0%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 166 19.9%
Other Firms 239 33.1%
High-Hours Firms 300 47.0%
Total 705 100.0%
Hires Temporary Workers
Hires Temporary Workers 138 14.9%
Does Not Hire Temporary Workers 412 85.1%
Total 550 100.0%
Offers Health Insurance
Offers Health Insurance 630 60.8%
No Health Insurance 97 39.2%
Total 727 100.0%
Firm Has More Than 80 Percent Women?
More Than 80 Percent Women 109 24.3%
Other Firms 596 75.7%
Total 705 100.0%
25% or More of Employees Are Workers of Color
More Than 25 Percent Workers of Color 473 64.0%
Other Firms 254 36.0%
Total 727 100.0%
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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Appendix Table 1: Workers Who Can Use for Specified Purpose and Earn at the Required Rate                  
Has PSD for Own Health Has PSD for Family Care Has PSD To See Doctor            
Yes No Don't Know Yes No Don't Know Yes No Don't Know    
All Workers 79.3% 15.4% 5.3% 63.2% 25.2% 11.6% 68.8% 24.9% 6.4%  
Age
Age 25 to 54 Years 80.8% 14.3% 5.0% 66.2% 22.8% 10.9% 70.0% 23.5% 6.5%     
Age 55 or Over 78.1% 17.8% 4.1% 56.9% 31.8% 11.4% 66.2% 28.6% 5.3%    
Sex
Men 78.0% 16.9% 5.0% 60.1% 29.0% 10.9% 67.4% 27.3% 5.3%
Women 80.9% 13.5% 5.6% 67.0% 20.5% 12.5% 70.5% 21.9% 7.6%
Race/Ethnicity
Black 87.3% 10.6% 2.1% 72.7% 20.1% 7.2% 69.5% 25.3% 5.3%
Latino 76.4% 20.2% 3.4% 57.8% 33.9% 8.3% 55.3% 36.8% 8.0%
Other 80.8% 12.7% 6.5% 66.2% 23.1% 10.7% 72.8% 21.9% 5.3%
White 78.6% 15.4% 6.0% 61.9% 24.2% 13.9% 70.1% 22.7% 7.1%
Parents 75.2% 17.9% 7.0% 68.4% 23.5% 8.1% 71.4% 23.8% 4.8%
Mothers 77.0% 18.5% 4.5% 72.5% 21.4% 6.1% 77.1% 19.3% 3.6%
Single Mothers 67.5% 28.9% 3.6% 59.8% 34.4% 5.8% 53.9% 43.5% 2.6%  
Chronically Ill 77.1% 19.6% 3.3% 56.0% 30.9% 13.1% 70.5% 24.5% 5.1%  
Union Members 86.0% 11.0% 3.1% 62.1% 26.6% 11.2% 63.8% 30.8% 5.4%  
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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               Appendix  Table 1 (cont.): Workers Who Can Use for Specified Purpose and Earn at the Required Rate
            Has All PSD Uses Accrues at Least 1/30 Hours Has All Uses and Accrues
   Yes No Don't Know Yes No Don't Know Yes No Don't Know N
 All Workers 53.3% 31.2% 15.6% 64.3% 19.1% 16.6% 44.1% 29.0% 26.9% 1,172
Age
    Age 25 to 54 Years 56.2% 28.6% 15.1% 66.0% 17.2% 16.8% 46.4% 26.6% 27.0% 721
   Age 55 or Over 47.1% 37.5% 15.4% 67.2% 20.8% 12.0% 43.2% 34.9% 21.9% 342
Sex
Men 51.2% 33.7% 15.0% 61.2% 21.0% 17.8% 40.4% 31.4% 28.2% 623
Women 55.7% 28.1% 16.2% 68.2% 16.8% 15.1% 48.6% 26.1% 25.3% 549
Race/Ethnicity
Black 52.3% 35.8% 11.9% 64.0% 15.5% 20.5% 40.1% 35.9% 24.1% 86
Latino 44.3% 41.8% 13.9% 60.8% 23.9% 15.3% 33.5% 42.0% 24.5% 108
Other 55.3% 31.0% 13.8% 66.1% 16.7% 17.2% 46.0% 25.3% 28.7% 194
White 54.6% 27.6% 17.8% 64.5% 19.1% 16.4% 46.9% 25.6% 27.5% 745
Parents 58.1% 30.7% 11.1% 63.6% 21.5% 14.8% 47.6% 30.0% 22.4% 305
Mothers 62.0% 29.6% 8.5% 69.9% 17.8% 12.2% 54.1% 28.9% 17.0% 149
 Single Mothers 42.8% 51.3% 5.8% 47.5% 24.7% 27.8% 29.9% 40.0% 30.0% 35
 Chronically Ill 47.8% 35.7% 16.5% 65.2% 20.9% 13.9% 41.7% 32.5% 25.8% 276
 Union Members 50.1% 35.9% 14.1% 71.4% 13.0% 15.6% 45.3% 27.7% 27.0% 218
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 Appendix Table 2: How Firms Changed Their PSD Pol icies in Response to the PSLO
Increased Expanded Firm Made Changes?
the Accrual an Existing
Enacted a Rate for an Policy to Not Sure if
Provides New PSD Existing Cover More One or Changes
Firm Characteristics PSD Policy Policy Workers More No Were Made
All Firms 82.1% 17.0% 15.8% 17.1% 30.6% 63.7% 5.7%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 78.4% 15.1% 11.9% 11.3% 24.3% 70.0% 5.8%
10 to 24 92.0% 25.9% 30.0% 32.2% 49.8% 45.6% 4.6%
25 to 49 97.5% 23.2% 27.6% 38.8% 49.9% 47.4% 2.7%
50 or More 99.4% 15.8% 25.8% 46.5% 58.4% 31.1% 10.5%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 62.1% 38.5% 17.4% 23.3% 46.0% 30.3% 23.7%
Construction 69.3% 39.5% 50.0% 28.2% 66.3% 29.9% 3.8%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 89.2% 21.5% 13.6% 14.2% 32.6% 66.3% 1.1%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 93.2% -6.2% 8.2% 8.4% 10.8% 87.3% 1.9%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 85.3% 5.4% 10.9% 13.7% 20.7% 76.3% 3.0%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 77.9% 16.4% 15.6% 17.3% 32.4% 65.7% 1.9%
Other Services 78.5% 24.0% 33.6% 27.9% 49.7% 41.1% 9.2%
Other 91.6% 12.0% 9.4% 16.6% 24.3% 72.4% 3.3%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 69.7% 18.6% 19.0% 17.4% 35.0% 57.7% 7.3%
High-Wage Firms 87.1% 15.7% 15.3% 14.3% 26.4% 70.3% 3.3%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 73.7% 21.1% 14.8% 16.7% 30.9% 62.8% 6.2%
High-Hours Firms 88.7% 10.1% 13.9% 15.2% 24.1% 72.1% 3.8%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 82.3% 14.6% 16.2% 17.9% 30.1% 62.5% 7.5%
Other Firms 80.8% 24.0% 14.6% 15.4% 32.9% 66.9% 0.2%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of Employees Are Non-White 84.5% 11.6% 16.4% 13.1% 24.7% 73.7% 1.6%
Other Firms 76.1% 27.4% 14.3% 23.1% 40.8% 48.3% 10.9%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Union Members 91.8% 11.4% 32.8% 48.8% 62.0% 37.1% 0.8%
No Union Members 81.7% 17.3% 14.9% 15.5% 29.1% 65.0% 5.9%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn at least $15 per hour. More than 30 percent
of employees in “low-hours firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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Appendix Table 3: Firms Rarely Hire Replacement Workers
Share of Firms Hiring Outside Replacements for Workers Using PSD:
Firm Characteristics Always Frequently Rarely Never Don't Know
All Firms 1.2% 7.2% 23.6% 65.6% 2.4%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 0.7% 7.4% 21.0% 68.1% 2.8%
10 to 24 3.3% 7.7% 28.8% 59.6% 0.5%
25 to 49 3.3% 2.5% 35.8% 57.0% 1.3%
50 or More 1.5% 8.0% 38.9% 50.3% 1.3%
Industry
Accommodation and Food Service 1.6% 30.8% 25.5% 41.9% 0.2%
Construction 0.0% 6.9% 22.7% 70.5% 0.0%
Education, Health Care, and Social Services 1.1% 4.3% 28.5% 65.9% 0.2%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.0% 4.8% 36.6% 57.1% 1.5%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 1.7% 2.0% 34.1% 57.5% 4.8%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 1.4% 1.4% 8.5% 88.6% 0.2%
Other Services 0.0% 10.0% 8.3% 72.8% 8.9%
Other 2.4% 4.4% 21.3% 69.8% 2.1%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 1.1% 14.4% 12.5% 66.4% 5.6%
High-Wage Firms 1.0% 2.1% 24.1% 70.6% 2.1%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 2.6% 13.9% 19.2% 62.4% 2.0%
High-Hours Firms 0.7% 3.4% 25.3% 66.6% 4.0%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of Employees Are Women 1.0% 9.1% 25.5% 62.5% 2.0%
Other Firms 2.0% 2.2% 16.4% 76.5% 3.0%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of Employees Are Non-White 0.6% 6.5% 19.3% 72.1% 1.4%
Other Firms 2.3% 9.4% 26.8% 59.1% 2.5%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are Union Members 5.1% 5.2% 27.1% 62.0% 0.5%
No Union Members 1.0% 7.3% 23.4% 65.8% 2.5%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30
percent of employees in “low-hours firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data. 
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Appendix Table 4: Effect of the PSLO on Business Operations
Impact on Employee Morale Impact on Customer Service Impact on Presenteeism
About the Don't About the Don't About the Don't
Firm Characteristics Better Same Worse Know Better Same Worse Know Better Same Worse Know
All Firms 3.2% 82.9% 0.9% 13.0% 1.2% 81.9% 2.6% 14.3% 3.3% 80.4% 3.4% 12.9%
Number of Employees
1 to 9 2.3% 81.6% 0.2% 15.9% 0.9% 81.1% 0.9% 17.1% 2.1% 81.4% 1.5% 15.0%
10 to 24 4.4% 89.1% 3.0% 3.5% 1.9% 82.4% 10.3% 5.4% 6.6% 77.0% 9.4% 7.0%
25 to 49 8.6% 83.2% 3.3% 4.9% 4.2% 86.0% 5.6% 4.2% 9.4% 77.1% 9.9% 3.7%
50 or More 7.5% 83.5% 3.5% 5.5% 0.3% 89.0% 1.9% 8.9% 5.5% 77.5% 7.8% 9.1%
Industry
Accommodation and 
Food Service 2.8% 76.6% 0.8% 19.7% 2.4% 73.8% 4.1% 19.7% 4.9% 69.9% 4.6% 20.5%
Construction 5.6% 73.6% 8.6% 12.2% 0.0% 83.1% 11.2% 5.6% 6.1% 77.3% 10.0% 6.6%
Education, Health Care,
and Social Services 3.1% 77.8% 1.1% 17.9% 1.4% 80.4% 0.7% 17.5% 2.2% 78.1% 2.8% 16.9%
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 6.7% 84.6% 0.1% 8.6% 2.4% 87.6% 1.4% 8.6% 0.6% 88.7% 2.8% 7.9%
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services 2.0% 87.0% 0.7% 10.2% 0.9% 87.3% 0.7% 11.2% 2.9% 86.0% 0.6% 10.5%
Retail and Wholesale Trade 2.1% 82.5% 0.6% 14.8% 0.0% 84.4% 1.4% 14.2% 1.3% 82.9% 4.7% 11.0%
Other Services 1.6% 80.1% 0.0% 18.3% 0.8% 68.1% 2.1% 29.1% 10.7% 68.8% 0.6% 19.9%
Other 4.2% 91.9% 1.2% 2.8% 1.3% 85.2% 7.3% 6.1% 1.8% 82.6% 7.0% 8.7%
Wage Levels
Low-Wage Firms 3.0% 85.9% 1.6% 9.4% 2.0% 82.2% 2.5% 13.3% 2.4% 84.8% 3.6% 9.3%
High-Wage Firms 2.7% 82.6% 0.7% 14.0% 0.7% 83.8% 1.2% 14.3% 4.2% 80.9% 1.8% 13.1%
Firms Work-Hours
Low-Hours Firms 6.3% 79.5% 1.1% 13.1% 0.8% 82.2% 3.7% 13.4% 3.0% 77.3% 5.5% 14.2%
High-Hours Firms 1.7% 85.8% 1.3% 11.3% 1.3% 84.5% 2.6% 11.6% 4.9% 82.3% 2.0% 10.8%
Female Workforce
More Than 80 Percent of 
Employees Are Women 3.5% 82.4% 1.2% 12.9% 1.6% 81.0% 3.3% 14.1% 2.7% 80.6% 4.1% 12.6%
Other Firms 2.4% 84.4% 0.2% 13.0% 0.1% 84.5% 0.5% 14.9% 5.3% 79.5% 1.3% 13.9%
Diverse Workforce
50 Percent or More of 
Employees Are Non-White 3.8% 82.9% 0.7% 12.5% 0.7% 83.0% 1.3% 15.0% 4.0% 82.4% 1.1% 12.5%
Other Firms 2.8% 81.7% 1.0% 14.5% 2.1% 79.1% 4.5% 14.3% 2.5% 77.2% 6.5% 13.8%
Has Unionized Workers
Some Employees Are 
Union Members 2.6% 84.7% 2.8% 9.9% 0.3% 91.9% 4.0% 3.9% 2.3% 89.4% 4.7% 3.6%
No Union Members 3.3% 82.8% 0.8% 13.1% 1.3% 81.4% 2.5% 14.8% 3.4% 79.9% 3.4% 13.4%
Note: At least one worker in “low-wage firms” earns less than $10 per hour; all employees in “high-wage firms” earn more than $15 per hour. More than 30 percent
of employees in “low-wage firms” work less than 10 hours per week; in “high-hours firms,” all employees work at least 30 hours per week. 
Source: IWPR analysis of employer survey data.
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